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INTRODUCTION 
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to 
the federal government are few and defined. Those which 
are to remain in State governments are numerous and 
indefinite.” 
The above statement was made by James Madison in response to an 
uproar concerning the danger of leaving a portion of authority to the 
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several states through the United States Constitution. His concept of states’ 
power was and is appropriate to this day. States are in more promising 
positions to decide what is best for the improvement and prosperity of their 
own state. An accurate example would be the power of the states to 
implement their own state-innovated plans through healthcare waivers. 
The federal government views state flexibility as a critical tool in carrying 
out the Medicaid program.1 States have been responsible for directing 
payment and service delivery reform that stabilizes Medicaid’s versatile 
objectives of reconstructing access, providing quality care, and controlling 
costs.2 
However, there is consistent controversy in how the lines of this 
flexibility are drawn.3 There have been debates concerning whether the 
federal government is too lenient or strict in approaching state waiver 
requests.4 Also, private suits have disputed certain state actions, such as 
rate reductions and various expenditure reforms that are thought to hinder 
accessibility.5 In these situations, the legislative and regulatory structure 
promotes state flexibility but maintains procedural constraints and 
substantive restraints.6 
The federal government commonly confirms its approval for more 
state flexibility in response to the tension.7 For instance, Congress rectified 
the Medicaid Act to broaden the range of state power in numerous program 
operations.8 In March 2017, the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) 
issued a letter to United States governors declaring the federal 
government’s alliance with the states to boost the principle and efficiency 
of the Medicaid program for low-income beneficiaries.9 This letter invites 
states to develop plans based on beliefs that mirror the state’s culture.10 
                                                                                                             
1 See generally Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 67,576, 67,578 (Nov. 2, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 447); see also Brietta 
Clark, Medicaid Access & State Flexibility: Negotiating Federalism, 17 HOUS. J. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 241, 243–44 (2017). 
2 Id. 
3 See Clark, supra note 1, at 243–44 (citing Methods for Assuring Access to Covered 
Medicaid Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,576, 67,578 (Nov. 2, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
§ 447)). 
4 See Laura D. Hermer, On the Expansion of “Welfare” and “Health” Under Medicaid, 
9 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 235, 257–58, 263 (2016). 
5 See generally Brietta R. Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: 
How the Obama Administration is Undermining its Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOW. 
L.J. 771, 846–51 (2012). 
6 Clark, supra note 1, at 244. 
7 Id. at 319, n.241. 
8 Id. at 244. 
9 Id. at 291, n.140. 
10 Id. 
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Part I of this Comment explores the overall function and process of 
waivers. It also identifies the concept of state flexibility through waivers. 
Part II examines the shift in health care delivery law, which went from a 
cooperative federalism to a collaborative federalism approach. Part III 
takes a closer look into states that have utilized their flexibility in 
developing innovation health care systems through 1332 waivers. It 
discusses the specific details of Alaska’s, Oregon’s, and Hawaii’s unique 
programs, and it illustrates how the authority they gained through waivers 
has allowed them to stabilize the state’s health care market. Part IV 
concludes by considering the opportunities that are afforded through 1332 
waivers. 
I. THE BIRTH OF WAIVERS 
Modern administrative law developed in reply to the common 
delegation of expansive lawmaking authority to administrative agencies.11 
This gives agencies the power to create policies that Congress deliberately 
decided not to create.12 However, there is a form of delegation of 
expansive lawmaking power that seems to be commonly overlooked: the 
extensive, unrestricted power of agencies to govern whether rules 
established by Congress should be discarded.13 Instead of making law that 
Congress has not, this power allows agencies to waive laws made by 
Congress.14 
The politically controversial Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (“ACA”) was designed to “improve access to and the delivery of 
health care services for all individuals, particularly low income, 
underserved, uninsured, minority, and rural populations.”15 Nevertheless, 
some states chose not to expand Medicaid, leaving millions of Americans 
without health coverage because their incomes exceeded the federal 
Medicaid limit but fell under the premium tax credit threshold.16 These 
states also experienced an increase in hospital uncompensated care costs.17 
                                                                                                             
11 See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 265, 266 (2013). 
12 Id. at 267. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H. R. 3590-470, § 5001 (2010). 
16 Rachel Garfield, Anthony Damico & Kendal Orgera, The Coverage Gap: Uninsured 
Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June 12, 
2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-
in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/. 
17 See Becca Aaronson, Without Medicaid Expansion, Hospitals Seek Long-Term 
Solution, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Feb. 14, 2014), www.texastribune.org/2014/02/14/without-
medicaid-expansion- hospitals-seek-long-term; see also Jeffrey Young, Hospitals In States 
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Luckily, permitting health coverage through Section 1115 waivers to 
expand Medicaid can seal this gap and lower hospital uncompensated care 
costs.18 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act (“SSA”) permits states to 
propose waivers to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”) for authorization of “[e]xperimental, pilot, or 
demonstration projects that promote the objectives of the Medicaid.”19 
These demonstrations give states greater discretion to create and better 
their programs.20 The goal is to establish and assess state-specific policy 
techniques to enhance serving Medicaid communities.21 Waivers give 
states the chance to enact amendments that surpass conventional medical 
care and concentrate on “evidence-based interventions,” encouraging 
improved health results, and enhancing quality of life.22 
CMS conducts a case-by-case analysis of each plan to detect whether 
its objectives coordinate with those of Medicaid.23 CMS also examines 
whether projected waiver expenses are suitable and compatible with 
federal guidelines.24 Also, the demonstrations are required to be “budget 
neutral” to the federal government;25 so, federal Medicaid expenses cannot 
exceed federal spending without the demonstration.26 Waivers are 
commonly approved for a primary five-year term and, contingent upon the 
populations served, may be lengthened for to an added three to five years.27 
For years, states applied for Section 1115 waivers solely to offer 
Medicaid premium assistance to compensate ineligible parents of children 
eligible for the Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(“CHIP”) or employer-based coverage.28 Nonetheless, with substantial 
federal funding given to the states by the ACA, the role of Section 1115 
                                                                                                             
That Won’t Expand Medicaid Left With More Unpaid Bills, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 
2014), www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/24/medicaid-expansion-hospitals5876980.html. 
18 See Anne McKenzie, Section 1115 Waivers, the Future of Medicaid Expansion, 27 
HEALTH L. 12, 12 (2015). 
19 See About Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID, https://www.medicaid.gov
/medicaid/section-1115-demo/about-1115/index.html. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 About Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid
/section-1115-demo/about-1115/index.html. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Garfield et al., supra note 16; see also Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396d(a) (2018); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396e (2018); see also Frequently Asked 
Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, CMS (Dec. 10, 2012), 
www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Down loads/exchanges-faqs-12-10-2012.pdf. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 333 
 
waivers was fundamentally transformed.29 The ACA took away the states’ 
requirement to acquire waivers to cover low-income Americans because it 
raised the federal poverty level (“FPL”) income percentage, so these adults 
are now covered by federal Medicaid.30 Now, states are able to use 
additional federal funding under the ACA to carry out the expansion in 
ways that vary from federal law.31 
When the ACA was first enacted in 2010, the federal government ran 
into issues when it attempted to link states’ current Medicaid funding to 
the required expansion obligation under the ACA.32 The federal funding 
provided to states through Medicaid programs becomes a significant 
portion of states’ budgets.33 Section 2001 of the ACA demanded states to 
abide by the recent Medicaid coverage requirements.34 If states did not 
comply, then they would lose all federal funding.35 In response to the 
federal government’s coercion, twenty-six states, various citizens, and the 
National Federation of Independent Business (“NFIB”) filed a suit against 
the Secretary of HHS challenging the constitutionality of the Medicaid 
expansion provision.36 
In NFIB v. Sebelius, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the federal 
government was restricted from pressuring states into expanding by 
threatening to strip them of existing Medicaid funding.37 This decision led 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) and the 
National Health Law Program to conclude that limited Medicaid 
expansion was not authorized under Section 2001.38 So, states were 
provided two options: (1) completely expand Medicaid to encompass all 
                                                                                                             
29 Robin Rudowitz, Samantha Artiga & MaryBeth Musumeci, The ACA and Recent 
Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-aca-and-recent-section-l115-medicaid-
demonstration-waivers. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See 42 U.S.C.A § 1396(c) (2014); see also National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, SCOTUS BLOG, www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ national-
federation-of- independent-business-v-sebelius. 
33 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581 (2012). 
34 Id. at 2582; 24 U.S.C. § 1396(c) (2012). 
35 Sebelius, 132 U.S. at 2582. 
36 Id. at 2572. 
37 Garfield et al., supra note 16 at 2608 (explaining that although the Medicaid 
expansion provision of the ACA was found to violate the Constitution by commandeering 
states with the threat of losing their Medicaid funds, the individual mandate was found to 
be a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power). 
38 Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges and Market Reforms, CMS (Dec. 10, 
2012), www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/exchanges-faqs-12-10-2012.
pdf [hereinafter FAQs on Exchanges]. 
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individuals below 138 percent of the FPL; or (2) not expand at all.39 
Roughly half of the states expanded.40 
In 2012, CMS released a “FAQs on Exchanges, Market Reform, and 
Medicaid,” which explained the alternative option of expanding by 
requesting a Section 1115 waiver to command premium assistance or to 
ratify a state-tailored plan.41 Section 1115 power permits states to afford 
premium assistance in forms that do not satisfy federal requirements and 
to make modifications to their Medicaid programs to enhance care and 
reduce costs.42 
For example, some states are privatizing Medicaid to bridge the 
Medicaid gap.43 Privatization engages the use of federal funding to buy 
private insurance instead of Medicaid, allowing individuals that were 
eligible for Medicaid to be eligible for private insurance.44 This is a 
desirable method for states that wanted flexibility to control their health 
programs in conformance with their demands as opposed to Medicaid 
objectives.45 
In 2012, the federal government afforded $432 billion for federal and 
state Medicaid programs.46 Consequently, by 2014, the number of 
                                                                                                             
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(c)(14)(1) (explaining that Medicaid expansion expands 
eligibility to 133 % of the poverty level and allows 5% of income to be disregarded, 
effectively establishing the eligibility income as 138%). 
40 Where each state stands on ACA’s Medicaid expansion, ADVISORY BD. COMM. (Jun. 
14, 2013), www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2012/11/09/medicaid map-1ightbox/0; Dorn, 
S. et. al., What is the Result of States Not Expanding Medicaid? (Aug. 7, 2014), 
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 413 192-What-is-the-Result-of-States-Not- Expanding-
Medicaid.pdf.; Jeffrey Young, Hospitals In States That Won’t Expand Medicaid Left With 
More Unpaid Bills, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2014), www.huffingtonpost.com/2 
014/09/24/medicaid-expansion-hospitals n 5876980.html. 
41 Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges and Market Reforms, supra note 38. 
42 Rudowitz et al., supra note 29. 
43 Sarah Kliff, Privatizing the Medicaid expansion: ‘Every state will be eyeing this.’ 
WASH. POST. (Mar. 8, 2013), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ wp/2013/03/08/
privatizing-the-medicaid-expansion-every-state-will-be-eying-this. 
44 Rudowitz et. al., supra note 29; Premium Assistance in Medicaid and CHIP: An 
Overview of Current Options and Implications of the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. (Mar. 2013), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/premium-assistance-in-
medicaid-and-chip-an-overview-of-current-options-and-implications-of-the-affordable-
care-act/. 
45 See Medicaid Expansion Through Premium Assistance: Arkansas, Iowa, and 
Pennsylvania’s Proposals Compared, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/medicaid-expansion-through-premium-assistance-
arkansas-and-iowas-section-1115-demonstration-waiver-applications-compared. 
46 2013 Actuarial Report on the Financial Outlook for Medicaid, HHS (2013), 
http://medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Financing-and-
Reimbursement/ Downloads/medicaid-actuarial-report-2013.pdf. 
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uninsured Americans was reduced by approximately 10.3 million.47 Also, 
an added 8 million individuals were covered by Medicaid, leading to 
nearly $5.7 billion reduction in uncompensated hospital costs.48 
Similar to Section 1115 waivers, Section 1332 of the ACA is a catalyst 
for innovation called the Waiver for State Innovation program.49 Under 
this statute, since the beginning of 2017 states can ask the federal 
government for a five-year waiver of nearly every considerable coverage 
element of the ACA.50 The pillar of these waivers is the financing, which 
allows states to receive all subsidies that would have gone to the state’s 
residents in order to fund their reforms.51 
Section 1332 of the ACA allows a state to apply for a State Innovation 
Waiver to seek innovative approaches for presenting access to economical, 
high-quality health insurance to its residents while maintaining the 
fundamental protections of the ACA.52 States may waive provisions 
pertaining to the essential health benefits and metal tiers of coverage, as 
well as the correlated restraints on cost sharing for covered benefits.53 
States may adjust the premium tax credits and cost-sharing cuts, such as 
seeking an cumulative payment of what individuals would have otherwise 
collected in premium tax credits and cost-sharing cuts.54 In addition, states 
may revise or replace the marketplaces by altering or removing the 
individual or employer mandates.55 
To receive a 1332 waiver, a state must file an application with the 
Secretary of HHS that includes proof supporting its suitability for the 
waiver.56 The Secretary can find that the state is equipped only if the 
                                                                                                             
47 ASPE Issue Brief: Impact of Insurance Expansion on Hospital Uncompensated Care 
Costs in 2014, HHS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2014
/UncompensatedCare/UncompensatedCare.pdf. 
48 Id. 
49 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, PUB. L. NO. 111-148, § 1332, 
124 Stat. 120, 203 (2010). 
50 Heather Howard & Galen Benshoof, 1332 Waivers and the Future of State Health 
Reform, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 237, 237 (2015). 
51 Id. 
52 Section 1332: State Innovation Waivers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-
Waivers/Section_1332_State_Innovation_Waivers-.html. 
53 Jennifer Tolbert & Karen Pollitz, Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers: Current 
Status and Potential Changes, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (July 6, 2017), https://www.kff.org
/health-reform/issue-brief/section-1332-state-innovation-waivers-current-status-and-
potential-changes/. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 42 U.S.C. § 18052; see also Katherine Hayes & Sara Rosenbaum, Waivers for State 
Innovation, HEALTH REFORM GPS (Mar. 21, 2011), www.healthreformgps.org/resources/
waivers-for-state-innovation/. 
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alternative program encompasses as many benefits that are covered by the 
ACA’s fundamental health benefits plan,57 affords as many cost 
constraints as the ACA,58 and covers as many individuals as the ACA.59 
Furthermore, the states must present a 10-year budget plan to show that 
the alternative program would not further the federal deficit.60 
Upon receipt of an application, the Secretaries of HHS and Treasury 
must initiate a shared review within 45 days and make a decision within 
180 days on whether to approve the waiver.61 If the waiver is granted, then 
the state no longer has to (1) order individuals to purchase coverage or 
incur a tax penalty,62 (2) require employers with a minimum of 50 full-
time employees to provide health insurance to employees or incur a fine,63 
(3) establish mandatory exchanges,64 and (4) provide healthcare plans 
meeting only the minimum essential coverage standards.65 Nevertheless, 
these states still secure the premium tax credits and subsidies from the 
federal government.66 States can then use this funding to achieve 
alternative plans, rather than disbursing it to the insured.67 
The ACA allows for an integration of the waiver process by which 
states can request for 1115 and 1332 waivers in a single application.68 This 
mixed waiver process provides states with more flexibility.69 But, while 
approving combined waiver requests, the Secretary may not waive any 
                                                                                                             
57 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(A). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(B) (provide coverage and cost sharing protections against 
excessive out-of-pocket spending that are at least as affordable as the provisions of this 
title would provide); see also § 18022(c)(3). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(C) (provide coverage to at least a comparable number of its 
residents as the provisions of this title would provide). 
60 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (“ . . . application shall . . . contain . . . a 10-year budget plan for 
such plan that is budget neutral for the Federal Government . . . [so that it] will not increase 
the Federal deficit.”). 
61 Id.; see also Katherine Jett Hayes, Essential Benefits, HEALTH REFORM GPS (Jan. 12, 
2012), www.healthreformgps.org/resources/essential-benefits/. 
62 26 U.S.C. § 5001A(a), 1501(b) (2012). 
63 26 U.S.C. § 218a-b, 4980H, 1513(c)(7) (2012); 
see also Summary of New Health Reform Law, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 15, 2011), 
www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf. 
64 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012). 
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: 
Standards Related to Essential Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 
12,838, 12,860 (Apr. 26, 2013); see also Section 1332: State Innovation Waivers, supra 
note 52. 
66 See Hayes, supra note 61. 
67 See id. 
68 See Howard & Benshoof, supra note 50, at 237. 
69 See generally Meeting 2 Draft Minutes, STATE INNOVATION WAIVER TASK FORCE 
(Oct. 2014), http://govemor.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Meeting-2_Meeting-
Minutes- Approved.pdf. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 337 
 
non-healthcare federal law that is not within the Secretary’s power.70 
Innovation waivers cannot be used to alter Medicaid program guidelines.71 
When a state receives a waiver, it is required to document how it is 
managing the 1332 waiver requirements yearly.72 
Looking to the federal government’s financial assistance and 
accelerated and joint review process, a 1332 waiver appears designed to 
serve states with broad support by creating innovative plans to permit 
states to spare time and cost in enacting reforms.73 The goal of a 1332 
waiver is not only to provide “deference to a state’s sovereignty or 
diversity,” but also to welcome an improved functioning system by being 
more economical.74 Although Section 1332 affords states broad power to 
waive provisions of the ACA, it supplies four “guardrails” to protect 
against reductions in the amount of individuals insured, scope of benefits, 
destruction of affordability, and effect on the federal deficit.75 For approval 
of a waiver, a state’s plan must: (1) afford coverage that is at least as 
extensive as the coverage provided through the marketplace based on the 
essential health benefits; (2) afford coverage and cost sharing protections 
against unreasonable out-of-pocket expenses that are at least as 
inexpensive as marketplace coverage; (3) afford coverage to at least as 
many individuals as the marketplace without the waiver; and (4) cannot 
increase the federal deficit.76 
In addition to these substantive safeguards, Section 1332 also provides 
several procedural safeguards.77 Even if the state’s proposal satisfies the 
substantive protections, the Secretary of HHS and Secretary of the 
Treasury have the authority to reject waivers.78 A waiver cannot be 
approved for longer than five years and can be revoked if the Secretaries 
find that the plan is not meeting the requirements.79 Furthermore, prior to 
applying for a waiver, a state must pass legislation ratifying the state’s 
proposal to afford coverage through the waiver, providing certainty of 
                                                                                                             
70 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012); see also Application, Review, and Reporting 
Process for Waivers for State Innovation, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,700, 11,700 (Apr. 27, 2012). 
71 See Tolbert & Pollitz, supra note 53, at 2. 
72 See id. 
73 See Kimberly S. Min, Waiver for State Innovation: A Call for Increased Success or a 
Projected Failure, 26 HEALTH L. 32, 32 (2013). 
74 Id. at 34. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012). 
76 Id. 
77 Jason Levitis & Stuart Butler, Elements of a Compromise on State Innovation 
Waivers, BROOKINGS (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/09
/19/elements-of-a-compromise-on-state-innovation-waivers/. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
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comprehensive support among the state.80 Collectively, these protections 
are designed to guarantee that the extensive authority provided by waivers 
does not compromise the cost of health care, federal budget restraint, or 
the policy principle.81 
In 2015, HHS and the Treasury Department issued guidance on their 
interpretation of the law’s rules for waivers to afford comparable coverage, 
breadth, budget neutrality, and affordability.82 This guidance stated that 
“vulnerable residents” are not to be adversely impacted by revisions.83 It 
specified that if a waiver proposal adversely affects “vulnerable residents,” 
then the proposal would be rejected.84 The guidance defines vulnerable 
residents to encompass people who are low-income, elderly, have severe 
health problems or are at risk of developing severe health problems.85 
However, this guidance is not legally-binding and can easily be altered by 
later administrations. On his first day in office, President Trump issued an 
executive order indicating that states would be afforded expanded 
discretion in relation to ACA implementation.86 
II. THE SHIFT TO COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISM 
Because waivers under the ACA grant states more flexibility and 
power to design state-specific healthcare plans, the federal-state 
interaction seems to be shifting from cooperative federalism to 
collaborative federalism. States are no longer simply receiving federal 
orders. Now, states are creating the appropriate program guidelines and 
molding health policy from the bottom up. 
The Medicaid Program was long viewed as an example of cooperative 
federalism by scholars and the courts.87 Cooperative federalism supports 
the idea that the states’ powers and the federal government’s powers are 
                                                                                                             
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See Waivers for State Innovation, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,131, 78,132 (Dec. 16, 2015) (to be 
codified at 31 C.F.R. § 33 and 45 C.F.R. § 155). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 See Tolbert & Pollitz, supra note 53, at 2. 
87 See Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in Health 
Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 266, 
267–68 (2011) (viewing our current structure of health policy as an example of cooperative 
federalism that “entrusts large swaths of its implementation to the states.”); see also Philip 
J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 663, 668 (2001); see also Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. (Indep. Living 
Ctr.), 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1208 (2012); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2629 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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complementary to each other.88 Medicaid was described as “a cooperative 
federal-state program”89 because Congress was relying on a federal 
regulatory agency to develop certain standards for the state agencies to 
follow.90 Instead of permitting a federal agency to execute a uniform 
health-care structure for the nation’s poor, Congress afforded states the 
freedom to modify Medicaid grants to match the specific demands of each 
state if they abided by regulations set by federal law.91 In sum, Medicaid 
is a quintessential illustration of federal-state cooperation in supporting the 
country’s general welfare.92 
Two prevailing themes arose from this cooperative vision of health 
administration.93 First, state power is crucial evidence to rebut alleged 
federal coercion.94 For instance, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in NFIB 
rejected the finding that Medicaid expansion tied with the traditional 
Medicaid program was coercive and emphasized the ample sovereignty 
states maintain under the Act.95 On the other hand, the second theme 
highlights the value of federal law in regulating states’ flexibility.96 To 
health proponents, beneficiaries, and providers, the role of the federal 
government in drawing the lines of the states’ power is just as crucial.97 
For example, Medicaid devises privileges to those whom meet certain 
criteria.98 Individuals who are denied insurance may seek legal remedies 
in the courts.99 Additionally, the statute allows Medicaid beneficiaries to 
choose a provider, which precludes the states from barring compensation 
to providers without evidence of considerable quality of care concerns or 
provider status termination stemming from Medicaid fraud.100 
States have gone from nothing more than beneficiaries of federal 
mandates to agents heavily shaping the pertinent program guidelines and 
constructing health protocol from the ground up.101 Certain areas lack 
federal mandates or regulations that precisely specify the ways that states 
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should make certain types of choices. Consequently, states are supposed 
to create the specifics of the program model and interpret the substance of 
the same federal regulations that purportedly restrict state flexibility.102 
When viewed in this light, the relationship between federal and state 
power regarding health care is better described as collaborative. 
Even though Section 1115 waivers have provided states the chance to 
embrace this type of control, the deviating balance of power towards the 
states is demonstrated by the federal-state relationship occurring under the 
ACA.103 Since the emergence of the ACA, the federal government 
manifested a readiness to bargain with states desiring even more freedom 
in the execution of private and public coverage reforms.104 Even though 
opponents regard the considerable amount of funding at risk as proof of 
coercion, the truth is that states are proficient at finagling federal dollars 
to better benefit their own concerns. 
Under this collaborative federalism model, state flexibility is greater 
than a confined area cut out for states in a law governed by federal 
mandates. Instead, the federal government progressively respects its 
relationship with the state as active and considers state flexibility as crucial 
to the federal government’s motive for states to propel health policy. This 
view encompasses a more equal partnership in which both the federal 
government and the states are heavily engaged in molding the principles 
guiding more specific features of program design.105 It may have been the 
view that states were used for the function of achieving federal goals; 
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however, it is becoming more common that states are viewed as the ones 
in power by leveraging federal funds toward essential state objectives.106 
Before the start of the ACA, the federal government’s progressively 
generous granting of waivers was viewed as confirmation of flourishing 
state discretion in Medicaid.107 Now, under the ACA, there is a substantial 
contention that states acquired even more power. Because the Supreme 
Court made Medicaid expansion voluntary and the Act alone rendered 
state-operated coverage exchanges optional, the Obama Administration 
relied on states for the ACA to prosper. The federal government could not 
fulfill its desire to expand health care accessibility without the states. Thus, 
the need for each other’s support became equal between the federal and 
state governments. 
The development of a more balanced partnership between the states 
and the federal government does not end with negotiations concerning 
whether to obtain federal terms and funding. It persists as states explore 
distinct and advanced ways to provide and finance health care.108 While 
older federalism models oppose federal control of health care, 
collaborative federalism indicates that states may be liberated through 
federal spending programs. The belief is that states accept considerable 
federal funding, allowing them to explore financing methods and 
approaches to health care delivery to enhance health care for their citizens 
through methods they otherwise could not. In addition, this collaborative 
framework may have finally encouraged Republican-led states to adopt 
the Medicaid expansion. 
III. THE GLACIAL PACE OF STATE INNOVATION WAIVER 
APPROVAL 
To date, only eight states—Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Oregon, 
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, and Wisconsin—have submitted 
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successful 1332 waiver applications.109 And, although its waiver was 
approved, Minnesota did not receive full approval of its original 
application. 
A. Hawaii—The Pioneer of 1332 Waivers 
On December 30, 2016, Hawaii became the first and only state to have 
its 1332 waiver application approved.110 Specifically, Hawaii sought and 
was later permitted to waive the requirements of the ACA’s Small 
Business Health Options Program (“SHOP”).111 SHOP’s obligations 
directly conflicted with the state’s Prepaid Health Care Act.112 The Prepaid 
Health Care Act, ratified in 1974, requires the state’s employers to afford 
more generous insurance than is demanded under the ACA.113 Hawaii was 
also authorized to waive the requirement that the small business tax credits 
be available only through SHOP.114 
B. Alaska’s Model 
Alaska submitted a 1332 waiver application at the end of 2016 
requesting federal pass-through funding to partially finance the Alaska 
Reinsurance Program (“ARP”).115 The ARP fully or partially reimburses 
insurance providers for acquired claims for high-risk individuals 
diagnosed with certain health conditions, such as HIV/AIDS, cancer, and 
multiple sclerosis.116 Because Alaska subsidized the costs of individuals 
with high-cost diagnoses, it was able to lower the rising cost burden on the 
state’s market risk pool.117 Accordingly, Alaska’s insurance rates in 2017, 
which were anticipated to increase more than forty percent, were 
approximately only seven percent higher than the insurance rates for 
2016.118 
The approval of Alaska’s application demonstrates a method that other 
states could follow to reduce premiums in their marketplaces and better 
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allocate the costs of the very ill.119 The approval of this waiver will not 
alter the way individuals with pre-existing conditions receive care. These 
individuals will still enroll in the same plans and pay the same premiums 
as those who are healthy, receive all benefits, and, if eligible, collect 
premium credits and cost sharing cuts.120 Nevertheless, the costs of their 
claims will be compensated out of a pool funded by a broader set of payers, 
which reduces individual insurance premiums for everyone and stabilizes 
the marketplace.121 The pool is funded partly by an evaluation across the 
vast state-regulated coverage system, which includes the group market, 
and receives federal funding through the waiver.122 
The objective of Alaska’s reinsurance system is to reduce premiums 
in the individual market. Because the premiums are lower than they would 
be otherwise, the federal government does not have to reimburse as much 
to low- and middle-income individuals through premium tax credits.123 
Under the ACA, low- and middle-income families can receive premium 
tax credits for the disparity between the total cost of premiums in 
marketplace plans and a percentage of their income.124 Because 
reinsurance decreases the total cost of premiums in Alaska, the federal 
government salvages money.125 
Through Alaska’s waiver, federal savings are refunded to the state 
reinsurance program, balancing the individual market for years to come, 
reducing premiums, and mitigating the considerable fiscal pressure that 
Alaska is currently enduring.126 In fact, in August 2018, Alaska’s 
individual market provider announced that it filed for an average rate 
decrease of 3.9 percent, which is in addition to the 22.4 percent average 
decrease in premiums for 2018.127 Alaska also predicts that an additional 
1,485 people will enroll in Alaska’s individual market as a result of the 
reinsurance system’s outcome in reducing premiums.128 
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C. Oregon Follows on the Trail 
On October 18, 2017, the Trump Administration approved Oregon’s 
1332 waiver application.129 The state requested waiver of Section 
1312(c)(1)130 for a period of five years starting in 2018.131 Oregon 
established a state reinsurance program.132 While this waiver does not 
affect any other provision of the ACA, it produces reduced market-wide 
index rate, which decreases premiums and federal disbursement of 
advance premium tax credits.133 
The Oregon Reinsurance Program is structured to stabilize the 
individual market, cut rates, and invite insurance providers to provide 
plans in more areas of the state.134 Identical to the motive backing Alaska’s 
program, Oregon is utilizing reinsurance to disperse the risk of high-cost 
claims so that all insurance providers take an identical portion of the risk 
of costly claims.135 In fact, rates for individual plans in 2018 were six 
percent lower than they would be if there was no reinsurance program.136 
The Acting Director of Oregon’s Division of Financial Regulation 
emphasized that, without the program, there may have been counties 
suffering due to no plans provided through Oregon’s Health Insurance 
Marketplace, and it was exacerbated due to more individuals buying their 
own insurance in 2018.137 
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IV. THE POTENTIAL SUCCESS FOR COLLABORATIVE 
FEDERALISM BY WAIVER 
As with nearly anything vulnerable to variability, the instability 
among numerous state ACA exchanges has considerable downfalls for 
health insurance providers. Some providers are facing obstacles in selling 
profitable exchange plans because of high enrollment among sick 
individuals and low enrollment among health individuals.138 The negative 
impact of the instability flows over onto health care providers, 
pharmaceutical companies, and device manufacturers.139 When health 
insurance is unavailable or too expensive, fewer individuals are likely to 
be covered; thus, fewer individuals are able to buy health care services.140 
Nonetheless, if states execute favorable waiver programs, then 
opportunities can emerge for practically everyone in the health care 
industry.141 
To the extent that Section 1332 waivers permit states to develop 
reinsurance programs that overturn the instability in exchanges, all will be 
improved.142 Although it is uncertain whether merely enacting reinsurance 
programs is sufficient to stabilize individual markets in the states, HHS 
promoted the reinsurance waiver model founded on one year of 
involvement in Alaska.143 It is argued that Alaska is unique due to its small 
population, so it is unclear how such reinsurance programs will operate in 
other states.144 Specifically, reinsurance programs might not have ample 
funding to cancel out other market forces that push premiums to 
increase.145 Such determinants may include healthy individuals refusing to 
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buy coverage through the exchanges and unpredictability as to if the 
federal government will continue financing cost sharing reductions.146 
Instead of simply using 1332 waivers to create reinsurance programs, 
states can also utilize the waivers to request more extensive reform. 
Because states may not have the needed expertise to form large-scale 
innovations to their health care systems, health care companies may be 
able to provide proficiency in achieving state goals.147 In addition, 
companies that are prepared to create innovative designs to offer coverage, 
provide care, or sell products may discover exceptional opportunities to 
develop or invest in states that adopt 1332 waivers.148 
Nonetheless, slight legislative reform to the language and procedures 
in Section 1332 could lead to bipartisan approval.149 Changes could 
transform the innovation waiver procedure into a more useful program to 
the states while ridding of many drawbacks of the current structure.150 For 
example, if the regulations were relaxed for determining pass-through 
funding, it would allow states to distribute more of the federal dollars 
saved through their waivers, and then states would be able to make more 
widespread and cooperative reforms to their health care structures and the 
subsidization of care for low- and middle-income families.151 
Under the current law, pass-through funding is currently subject to two 
individual caps.152 Each cap individually limits the amount that can be 
compensated.153 First, Section 1332(a)(3) provides that pass-through 
funding is equivalent to the number of federal marketplace subsidies that 
would be made without the waiver but are relinquished under the 
waiver.154 Second, Section 1332(b)(1)(D) requires that a waiver does not 
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increase the federal deficit.155 Under this restraint, if the full amount of 
savings would result in increasing the deficit, then the pass-through 
funding is reduced to sustain deficit neutrality.156 This calculation is 
illustrated in the Alaska waiver approval letter.157 The waiver was 
projected to generate premium tax credits savings of approximately $50.5 
million in 2018.158 However, the waiver also requires federal costs, 
including a $700,000 cut in individual mandate payments and a $1.5 
million cut in user fees paid to the federal-aided marketplace.159 These 
effects net out to federal savings of nearly $48.4 million in 2018, and this 
amount—not the premium tax cut savings—is the determined amount of 
federal pass-through funding.160 
Capping pass-through funding is crucial to avoid violating the deficit 
neutrality guardrail.161 Nevertheless, it is not apparent why capping pass-
through funding at relinquished marketplace subsidy expenses is also 
fundamental.162 Under current law, only marketplace subsidy savings may 
be allotted to the state, and all other savings must be given up.163 This 
procedure decreases the appeal and practicability of waivers, which meet 
the guardrail requirements and are otherwise enticing.164 
For example, a waiver that develops a state program that decreases 
health coverage premiums in both the individual and group markets will 
generate marketplace subsidy savings that may be passed through to the 
state.165 However, decreasing premiums for employer-funded health 
insurance would also decrease the cost of the individual tax exclusion for 
employer-funded insurance.166 Thus, both federal individual income tax 
and payroll tax receipts would increase.167 The current regulation impedes 
these exclusion savings from being distributed to the state through pass-
through funding, consequently decreasing help for the state plan to cut 
premiums.168 Also, waivers that would decrease the cost of tax exclusion 
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for employer health insurance by transitioning people to the individual 
market would be similarly burdened.169 
In fact, the double constraint seems to have added to the derailment of 
New Hampshire’s potentially valuable waiver.170 New Hampshire was 
drafting a reinsurance waiver—similar to Alaska’s waiver—to reduce 
premiums in 2018.171 When other states requested a waiver, they 
determined that the federal pass-through funding would afford a wide 
portion of the funding for the reinsurance program.172 Nonetheless, when 
New Hampshire’s analysts calculated the amount, they found that pass-
through funding would offset less than thirty percent of its reinsurance 
program in 2018.173 
A significant reason for this small federal share seems to be the design 
of New Hampshire’s Medicaid program and how it cooperates with the 
dual cap on pass-through funding.174 New Hampshire expanded Medicaid 
eligibility under the ACA by enrolling the state’s expansion population in 
individual market coverage through a premium support model.175 A state 
reinsurance program would cut premiums among the individual market, 
including the sector aiding the expansion population.176 Under the ACA’s 
regulations for Medicaid expansion, the federal government covers ninety 
percent or more of the premiums for the expansion population.177 So, a 
reinsurance program would produce considerable Medicaid savings 
without affecting coverage for Medicaid beneficiaries.178 However, due to 
pass-through funding being capped at marketplace subsidy savings, 
Medicaid savings typically may not be passed through to the state.179 
On the other hand, an approach to addressing the dual cap constraint 
would be to modify the language in Section 1332(a)(3) to alternatively cite 
to overall net federal savings under the waiver.180 Therefore, all federal 
budget effects currently considered for intentions of deficit neutrality 
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would also be contemplated for intentions of pass-through funding.181 The 
Section should simply state that if the Secretary finds that there would be 
a decrease in the federal deficit throughout the duration of the waiver 
period, then the Secretary shall afford a method that the amount of such 
reduction is given to the states to carry out its plan under the waiver.182 
This proposition would alter how a waiver’s indirect impact on 
Medicaid and other federal programs is treated.183 Presently, indirect 
impacts are not considered for purposes of pass-through funding.184 This 
proposition would make these indirect savings weigh evenly for both 
guardrail and pass-through funding purposes.185 For instance, if a waiver 
generates savings from the tax exclusion, Medicare, and Medicaid without 
directly reforming these programs, then the accumulated savings would be 
taken into account for deficit neutrality and pass-through funding.186 
Also, an expedited review procedure for waivers that are similar to 
waivers that have already been approved would also be beneficial.187 A 
waiver that is substantially alike to an approved waiver has a much lower 
risk of being adverse.188 In addition, the HHS and the Treasury are 
presumably capable of producing projections faster by regenerating their 
fiscal analysis and modeling as opposed to building from nothing, 
specifically in situations where the fulfillment of the guardrails is not 
impacted by any disparities among the states.189 For example, Alaska’s 
application was filed in December 2016, indicated as complete in January 
2017, and approved in July 2017—approximately 180 days later.190 
Oklahoma filed its application in July 2017.191 The Secretaries would have 
needed to act in far fewer than 180 days for Oklahoma’s waiver to be 
approved in time for premiums to be adjusted for 2018.192 Instead, 
Oklahoma withdrew its waiver request because the federal administration 
did not approve it by September 25, 2017, even though it indicated it 
would do so.193 
Oddly enough, such fast acting appears both possible and suitable. The 
HHS and the Treasury have already interpreted state reinsurance programs 
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and how they affect state markets, guardrails, and premium tax credits.194 
Duplicating the Alaska research for Oklahoma appears somewhat clear-
cut. Although the duration of the expedited review does not have to be 
clearly specified, a general obligation that the Secretaries decide on an 
accelerated basis would suffice. However, there is optimism that this may 
be occurring without a definite provision of the waiver approval 
procedures, as illustrated by the approval of Oregon’s waiver request in 
approximately 50 days.195 
A final potentially valuable change to the current waiver approval 
procedure would be to increase the HHS and Treasury staff to help states 
and assess waiver applications. Analyzing waiver proposals and projecting 
waivers’ impacts usually adds up to evaluating an entirely new health care 
system, which demands advanced economic inquiry and modeling.196 Yet 
both HHS and the Treasury have minimal employee positions 
concentrated on the waiver program.197 In contrast, HHS has numerous 
personnel devoted to the Section 1115 waiver program.198 Congress could 
expedite the waiver application process by supplying the Departments 
with adequate resources to help states seeking waivers and assess 
completed applications.199 
CONCLUSION 
Collaborative federalism through Section 1332 waivers stabilizes 
expansive state authority with critical safeguards for health coverage and 
federal funding. Vast support for this system exists to advocate state 
innovation and acclimatization to each state’s unique health care demands. 
Nonetheless, revisions of Section 1332 could make it more practical and, 
therefore, more appealing to the states. 
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